Abstract-We study a class of LQG control problems with N decision makers possessing different dynamics. The basic objective is to minimize a social cost function as the sum of N individual costs containing mean field coupling. For large N, the exact socially optimal solution (which also has the Pareto optimality property) requires centralized information and this leads to high computational complexity. In this paper, we develop decentralized cooperative optimization so that the strategy of each agent only uses its own state and a function which can be computed off-line; the resulting set of strategies asymptotically achieves the social optimum as N → ∞. Our solution relies on a mean field approximation and the calculation of the social cost variation due to individual strategy perturbations. We also discuss the relationship between the socially optimal solution and the so-called Nash Certainty Equivalence based solution presented in previous work (see e.g. Huang, Caines and Malhamé, IEEE Trans. Auto. Control, Sept. 2007) on mean field LQG games. This leads to insights into connections and differences between cooperative and noncooperative solutions to mean field LQG problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
In decision problems with a large number of agents, mean field models have attracted significant attention due to their wide backgrounds [2] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [8] , [16] , [17] , [20] , [23] . In such models, a distinctive feature is the interaction between any given agent and the average effect of the overall population. In the search for decentralized optimization paradigms, game theoretic solutions have been successfully developed by different researchers [8] , [9] , [7] , [23] , [24] , [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] ; along this line, decentralized solutions may be obtained by identifying a consistency relationship between the individual-mass interaction such that within the population limit each individual optimally responds to the mass effect and these individual strategies also collectively produce the same mass effect presumed in the first place [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] . Under reasonable conditions we have shown the existence of a mass effect satisfying such a fixed point property and proven that the resulting set of decentralized individual strategies is an asymptotic Nash equilibrium. This solution property has been designated as the Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) principle [9] , [14] , [15] .
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When developing the above game theoretic solution framework, the starting point is that these agents are individual incentive driven and noncooperative. In this paper, within the mean field modeling we will examine a different situation where the agents are cooperative and seek socially optimal decisions. We note that the notion of social optima has long been a central issue in decision problems with multiple agents, and Pareto optimality is widely known as one approach for characterizing social optimality [1] , [22] . The goal of this paper is to study how the individual agents in a mean field model should choose their strategies for the optimization of a social objective. We consider both i) centralized strategies where each agent may use the state information of all agents and ii) decentralized strategies where each agent only uses local information. We will further examine the relationship of the two solution notions when the population size increases to infinity.
For the solution with centralized strategies in the linearquadratic-Gaussian (LQG) framework, one may proceed by treating this as a standard LQG control problem and the control strategies for the N agents may be obtained from a high dimensional algebraic Riccati equation. However, the solution is in general difficult to calculate unless some additional restrictions, such as scalar individual states and uniform individual dynamics, are imposed. Also, even if such a solution may be obtained, the informational requirement for implementing the strategies is high in that each agent needs to know the states of all agents. In contrast, the solution with decentralized strategies, if computable, is more useful due to its low complexity. For this reason, in most of our analysis, we will attempt to find such decentralized strategies.
The organization of the paper is as follows. The socially optimal control problem is formulated in Section II. The centralized solution is examined in Section III. For obtaining decentralized solutions, the social certainty equivalence (SCE) methodology is developed in Section IV. Section V provides an in-depth analysis of the scalar case, where a comparison with the NCE equation system is also presented.
II. THE SOCIALLY OPTIMAL CONTROL PROBLEM

A. Dynamics and Costs
We consider a system of N agents. The dynamics of agent i are given by the stochastic differential equation
The state x i and control u i are, respectively, n and n 1 dimensional vectors. The initial states {x i (0), 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, are independent, each with a finite second order moment. The noise processes {W i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N} are n 2 dimensional independent standard Wiener processes, which are also independent of the initial states {x i (0), 1 ≤ i ≤ N}. The deterministic constant matrices A(·), B and D all have compatible dimensions. The number θ i is a dynamic parameter associated with agent i. The variability of the parameter θ i is used to model a heterogenous population of agents. Notice that in (1) we only take A(·) to be dependent on θ i for the purpose of notational simplicity. When other matrix parameters for agent i also depend on θ i , the analysis is similar and will not be given in detail. We assume θ i takes values from the finite set Θ = {1, . . . , K} so that there are K types of agents. If θ i = k, agent i is called a k-type agent. Herein, for notational brevity the time argument for a process (x i , u i , etc.) will often be suppressed when the value of that process at time t is used. Denote
The individual cost for agent i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, is given by
where
We will call x (N) the mean field term. In (2) , all the deterministic constant matrices or vectors H, Q ≥ 0, R > 0 and η have compatible dimensions.
The social cost function is defined as
where agent i contributes the component J i .
The objective of the control problem is for the agents to minimize the social cost J (N) soc . To achieve this, from the point of view of an individual's control selection, it is necessary to maintain a delicate balance in reducing its own cost and also taking into account its social impact (i.e., affecting the total cost of all other agents combined together).
For the large population modeling of the agents, a natural way for modeling the sequence of dynamic parameters θ 1 , . . . , θ N is to view it as being sampled from an underlying parameter space such that when N → ∞, the sequence exhibits certain statistical properties; this is made precise by assumption (A1) introduced below. However, we need to make it clear that {θ i , i ≥ 1} is treated as a sequence of deterministic numbers. For a given N, define
where |I k | is the cardinality of the index set
K ) is a probability vector which gives the empirical distribution of θ 1 , . . . , θ N . We introduce the following assumptions:
(A1) There exists a probability vector π such that lim N→∞ π (N) = π, where π = (π 1 , . . . , π K ) and min 1≤k≤K π k > 0.
(A2) The initial states x i (0), 1 ≤ i ≤ N, are independent, Ex i (0) = 0 for each i ≥ 1, and there exists c 0 < ∞ independent of N such that sup i≥1 E|x i (0)| 2 ≤ c 0 .
It is implied by (A1) that when N → ∞, the proportion of k-type agents becomes stable for each k and that the number of each type of agents tends to infinity. Throughout the paper we make the convention that N is sufficiently large such that min 1≤k≤K N k ≥ 1.
For simplicity, in (A2) it is assumed that all agents have zero initial mean. It is possible to generalize our analysis to deal with different initial means as long as {Ex i (0), i ≥ 1} has a limiting empirical distribution (see related discussions in [9] ).
Remark: It is possible to treat A(·) as a function of θ i which takes values from a continuum. Our method of decentralized strategy synthesis can be extended without much difficulty. In this case, the limiting empirical distribution F(θ ) for {θ i , i ≥ 1} will be defined in an Euclidian space.
B. Two Solutions Based on Different Information Patterns
We will mainly study two problems for optimizing J Problem I-B -Find a social solution with decentralized information (SSDI), where the control u i in a feedback form is a function of (t, x i ). Note that when it is restricted to decentralized information, in general the set of controls of the N agents will not attain the same cost as in Problem I-A. Instead, a set of decentralized strategies {u i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N} is sought such that the optimality loss with respect to Problem I-A in minimizing J (N) soc tends to zero when N → ∞. For comparing with our previous work, the following problem will also be reviewed.
Problem II -Find a competitive solution with decentralized information (CSDI), where agent i is associated with the cost J i and the objective is to obtain a set of ε-Nash strategies such that each u i depends on local information.
For a detailed account of this competitive solution framework, the reader is referred to [9] .
III. THE CENTRALIZED SOLUTION
For Problem I-A, in principle, we may treat it as a standard LQG optimal control problem and the optimal control law (û 1 , . . . ,û N ) may be determined from a very high dimensional algebraic Riccati equation if the standard stabilizability and detectability conditions are satisfied [25] . However, the calculation of the optimal control law, either analytically or numerically, is in general intractable when N is very large unless further conditions, such as uniform dynamics, are imposed. In the first part of this section, our objective is to give a reinterpretation of each individual component in (û 1 , . . . ,û N ), which will motivate the construction of decentralized strategies via a mean field approximation argument.
To facilitate further analysis, we denote F t = σ (x(0), w 1 (s), . . . , w N (s), s ≤ t) for t ≥ 0, which is the σ -algebra generated by the initial condition x(0) and the Wiener processes up to time t. Denote the control set Suppose the system initial condition x(0) is given. A very important observation for Problem I-A is that any feedback control law u(t, x), if being continuous in (t, x) and Lipschitz continuous in x (ensuring a unique strong solution to the closed-loop system), naturally induces an optimal control process, denoted in the form u(t, ω) which belongs to U o . This is due to the fact that we may express x(t) of the closed-loop system in terms of the Wiener processes and the initial condition x(0). Note that under the stabilizability and detectability conditions, the optimal control law is a linear feedback control law, satisfying the above continuity assumptions.
Let the set of socially optimal controls be denoted by (û 1 , . . . ,û N ), which is now interpreted as a control from U 0 . Suppose the state trajectoryx i corresponds toû i . Denotê
j , which are two well-defined random processes. We have the following key lemma.
Lemma 1:
Let the initial condition x(0) be given. Let the admissible control set U oi consist of all u i adapted to
soc . Then u i is the unique optimal control for the control problem (P0):
where J 0 i (u i ) is to be minimized. Proof: Due to convexity of the cost J (N) soc and R > 0, the existence and uniqueness of an optimal control from the class U o is ensured when J (N) soc is minimized with respect to U o . Hence, when (û 1 , . . . , soc ,û i in general will depend on all W j , j = 1, . . . , N. In the following, we give a reformulation of Problem (P0).
Lemma 2:
In finding the optimal control u i ∈ U oi , the optimal control problem (P0) is equivalent to the optimal control problem (P1):
where J(u i ) is to be minimized and the admissible control set is U oi , and
we see that the process (û 1 , . . . ,û i−1 ,û i+1 , . . . ,û N ) has been specified in advance and will not change with u i . In addition, eachx j , j = i, does not depend on u i . Now, we write the integrand of J 0 i (u i ) as follows. For j = i, we may write
Here the hereafter, we use ( * ) to denote terms not depending on u i ; these terms may change from place to place. We also have
By evaluating the sum ∑ N k=1 Z k , we see that minimizing J 0 i in (6) is equivalent to minimizing J in (8) , and the lemma follows. Lemma 2 does not provide a convenient means for computing the optimal controlû i . Its significance is that it identifies a mean field structure in that all other agents' impact appears in the form ofx (N) −i , which has been determined as a fixed random process, not depending on u i . This feature is important for finding a decentralized suboptimal control u i , which will be achieved by a deterministic approximation of the term x (N) −i . The detailed analysis be developed in Section IV.
A. Explicit Solutions: The Scalar Model with Uniform Agents
In the case of scalar individual states with uniform dynamics, the coefficient of x i in (1) is denoted by the real number A. Without loss of generality, we set Q = 1 for the cost (2). In the study of the interaction between an individual agent and the mean field, we introduce the following parametrization. We set
where γ is a parameter and η 0 is fixed. In other words, H and η will be scaled by the same parameter γ. If we apply the parametrization (15) to the original mean field model (1)- (2), a larger value for γ means stronger interaction between x i and the term x (N) + η 0 . Now Φ appears in the form
If we rearrange the terms in the integrand of J (N) soc , we may write it in the form
where Q is given in the form
To find the optimal control law, we set a deterministic initial condition x(0) = z and write the optimal cost v associated with the optimal control problem in the form v(z) = z T Pz+2s T 1 z+s 0 . Invoking the standard results of LQG control [3] , [7] , we have
which results in P ∈ R N×N of the form
The eigenvalues of Q are given by
We consider two cases.
Case 1: γ = 1 such that λ 1 > 0. Then clearly Q > 0 and the pair [ Q 1 2 , A − (ρ/2)I N ] is observable, so that (19) has a unique solution P > 0.
Case 2:
is not fully observable. By using an orthogonal transformation Ψ such that Ψ T QΨ = Diag(λ i ) Λ Q , from (19) we obtain
We restrict the entry of Ψ T PΨ at the first row and the first column to be zero, corresponding to the unobservable state in the new coordinate system. Then we may find a unique Ψ T PΨ ≥ 0 of rank N − 1, and subsequently find P ≥ 0 to (19) .
For simplicity, in below we analyze Case 1. Substituting P into (19) 
and denoting
, we get the following equations
Under the positive semidefinite condition of P, solving (22)- (23) yields
For the reader's interest, the analysis of Case 2 is given in appendix A. We summarize the following result. Proposition 3: If γ = 1, there exists a unique solution P > 0 to (19) , and P is given by (21) , (24), (25) .
By well known results in LQG optimal control, the feedback control for the ith player is determined as
where s 1,i is the ith entry in s 1 . We have the expressions 
and the average optimal social cost per agent when N → ∞ is given by
IV. THE SOCIAL CERTAINTY EQUIVALENCE METHODOLOGY AND DECENTRALIZED STRATEGIES
Based on the cost structure in Lemma 2, we construct the following auxiliary optimal control problem with dynamics
and cost
andx is a deterministic function to be determined later.
The motivation for introducingx is as follows. When N is sufficiently large, it is plausible to approximate the term x (N) (9) by a deterministic functionx. We make the following assumption: (A3) For any value θ i ∈ {1, . .
. , K}, the pair [A(θ i ) − (ρ/2)I, B] is stabilizable and the pair
Denote the algebraic Riccati equation
where we denote A(θ i ) = A θ i . Under assumption (A3), (32) has a unique positive semidefinite solution Π θ i . Denote the ordinary differential equation
By using the method in [3] , [9] , [13] , we may show that the optimal strategyû i for minimizing J * is determined as the feedback control laŵ
The closed-loop dynamics take the form
where the initial condition isx i (0) = x i (0). We construct the following equation system by using the generic dynamic parameter θ ∈ {1, . . . , K}:
wherex θ (0) = 0 due to the zero mean assumption for the initial states of all agents, and s θ will obey a growth condition to be specified later. Note that the first two equations are based on (33) and (35). The last equation is based on the interaction consistency relationship, i.e., the mean field assumed at the beginning should be the same as the one replicated by the individual closed-loop dynamics of a large number of agents. This equation system will be referred to as the social certainty equivalence equation (SCE) system. Remark: When the sequence {θ i , i ≥ 1} takes values from a continuum, as a subset of an Euclidean space, and has a limiting empirical distribution function F(θ ) (see the remark in Section II-A), (38) in (36)-(38) needs to be replaced bȳ
A. The Variational Method
In this subsection, we describe a different approach to the mean field approximation, and this is potentially useful for generalization to nonlinear models. We begin with a deterministic model with finite horizon. After the control law for this model is determined, we may extend the analysis to stochastic models with either finite or infinite horizon. Let the dynamics of agent i be given by
with initial condition x i (0) = 0, and its cost be given by At the social optimum, the cost of agent i is given by
wherex i is associated with the socially optimal control. We consider the perturbation ofû i toû i + δû i where δû i is a continuous function on [0, T ]. Suppose the control variation δû i corresponds to the state variation δx i . We have
This gives the first variation of J i with respect to δû i
To check the cost variation of agent j = i, we write
Let δĴ j (δû i ) be the first variation of J j evaluated at (x k ,û k , k = 1, . . . , N) with a control perturbation δû i . We have
The aggregate cost variation (over all agents except agent i) is obtained as
The social cost variation is defined as
The zero first variational condition
generates the following condition in a large population limit:
where we supposex (N) contained in (39) is approximated by a deterministic functionx when N is large. The function is presumed to be known first and we will determine it by imposing a consistency condition subsequently. We write (40) in the equivalent form
The condition (41) shows that the optimalû i is determined by a modified optimal tracking problem. By solving the optimal tracking problem associated with (41) and lettingx be replicated by the closed-loop dynamics of a large number of agents, we will again obtain the same equation system (36)-(38) when T → ∞. The related detail is omitted here.
B. Connection with the NCE Equation System
To compare with our past work on Problem II, we review the Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) approach for the game problem when agent i is associated with cost J i . To obtain decentralized strategies, this approach proceeds as follows. First, the representative agent i approximates the coupling term Hx (N) + η in (2) by a deterministic function Hx + η and solves an optimal tracking problem. Next, the mean process Ex i for the closed-loop of agent i is determined by an ordinary differential equation. Finally, all the individual agents shall replicate the same mass effectx assumed at the beginning. This procedure leads to the following NCE equation system:
Here the reuse of notation (s θ ,x θ ,x) (which is also used in (36)-(38))) should cause no risk of confusion. Then the strategy of agent i is given as
It can be shown that the set of strategies {u i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N} given by (45) is an ε-Nash equilibrium [9] . We can see that the NCE equation system differs from the SCE equation system only by a different equation for s θ . The reason is that in the socially optimal decision problem, each agent must consider its social impact when choosing its strategy and cannot simply make optimal response to a deterministic approximation of Hx (N) + η for large N.
V. SOLUBILITY OF THE SCALAR MODEL WITH UNIFORM DYNAMICS Recall that for the scalar case, we set Q = 1, and H and η are parametrized according to (15) . Let Π > 0 be the solution to the algebraic Riccati equation
We have
A. Comparison of Solvability of the Two Equation Systems
Now, the SCE equation system (36)-(38) for the social optima reduces to the form
which no longer contains the subscript θ due to a uniform population of agents. For this scalar model, the NCE equation system (42)-(44) reduces to
For further analysis of (46)- (47), we introduce the set of algebraic equations
The following lemma may be easily verified.
Lemma 5:
The equation system (50)-(51) has a unique solution
We study the solvability of the above two equation systems (46)- (47) and (48)- (49) within the class of functions
Note that the parameter ρ ′ may depend on the specific function f . We have the following theorem about the solvability of the two equation systems in terms of the range of γ. Note that γ provides a measure of the strength of interaction between an individual and the mean field.
We state the following result with a general initial conditionx(0), not necessarily restricted to be 0. 
and γ = (β 1 β 2 )/B 2 , then a) the steady state equation system of (48)-(49) has a unique solution (s(∞),x(∞)); b) the NCE equation system (48)-(49) has a unique solution (s(t),
when the initial conditionx(0) coincides withx(∞), and otherwise there is not solution from such a function class. Proof: i) Let (s(∞),x(∞)) be given by Lemma 5. Denotẽ (46)- (47), we obtain the ODE system:
We may check that the matrix
has two eigenvalues
The solution (s,x) to (54)- (55) is given by e Mt [s(0),
Sincex(0),x(∞) and s(∞) have been determined, we may uniquely obtain
where β 2 − λ 2 < 0, such that (56) is satisfied. Subsequently, we obtain a unique solution (s,
ii) The method of proof is similar to part i). We omit the detail.
Now we investigate the performance of the SCE based decentralized strategies in the scalar model with uniform agents. Denote
where s is determined from (46)-(47). 
In both Scenarios 1 and 2, P has exactly one zero eigenvalue p + (N − 1)q = 0. For Scenario 1, when the control law is constructed using the algebraic Riccati solution, we can verify that the closed-loop of the N agents has N eigenvalues each being less than ρ/2.
For Scenario 2, when the control law is constructed using the algebraic Riccati solution, we can verify that the closedloop has N − 1 eigenvalues each being less than ρ/2 and the other eigenvalue is equal to or greater than ρ/2.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 7
The idea of proof is to compare the mean field processes generated by the centralized strategies and decentralized strategies, respectively. Below we only sketch the main estimates for establishing the theorem.
Under the set of centralized optimal control laws, given by (26) and now denoted by u c i , for all N agents, we denote the average state x for some ρ 4 < ρ. Here u c i and u d i are interpreted as the two random processes induced by the control laws. Consequently, the theorem follows.
